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1 Frege’s theory of meaning and its critics
1.1 A one-sorted semantics
Frege’s rationale is to uphold his own theory of meaning by means of an
argument by contraposition (α ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (¬ψ ⊃ ¬α). It runs as follows: If
(α) every sign (Zeichen) of an arbitrary sentence includes both a sense
(Sinn) and a reference (Bedeutung),
then
(ψ) no substitution of equivalent components (with the same reference)
alters the whole.
Now if
(¬ψ) at least one counterexample of this substitution salva veritate can
be found,
then
(¬α) Frege’s theory of meaning collapses.
The kinds of argument under review are the following: Frege asserts both
α and ψ; Kripke denies α and asserts ψ; Hintikka asserts α and denies ψ.
The contrast between two modes of meaning (conveying information)
through every linguistic item, that is the one between “sense” and “reference”,
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primarily cancels some naïve theory of meaning, according to which every
sign would purport to tag or label one object (recall Quine’s museum myth
of meanings [13], or Saint Augustine’s assimilation between meaning and
pointing something out [14]). How to account for the information gain from
“a = a” to “a = b”, if meaning is reduced to reference?
For this purpose, Frege’s philosophy of language relies upon two main
assumptions: compositionality, and extensionalism. According to the for-
mer, the reference of a complex sentence is determined by the reference of
its components and sense (reference) cannot contribute to determinate a
reference (sense). A crucial point for the following: the references of sen-
tences are truth-values, among the True and the False. It is for this reason
that Frege’s logic, because it has primarily occurred as a science of truth,
is uniquely concerned with references and never deals with matters of sense
concerning the informative value conveyed by a sign. The close connection
between logic and truth has been famously claimed by Frege [4: 170] in these
introductory words:
The word “true” indicates the aim of logic as does “beautiful” that of
aesthetics or “good” that of ethics. All sciences have truth as their
goal; but logic is also concerned with it in a quite different way from
this. It has much the same relation to truth as physics has to weight
or heat. To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic
to discern the laws of truth.
Because logic deals with truth, and truth is a reference, the very idea of
a logic of sense cannot be but troublesome. Accordingly, a way out is to
revisit the logical notions of truth and sense.
Following his one-sorted semantics, every sign expresses a sense and refers
to an object: individual variables (x, y, z, . . .) refer to individuals while ex-
pressing an individual concept; predicate variables (P , Q, R, . . .) refer to
properties while expressing concepts; sentence variables (p, q, r, . . .) refer
to truth-values while expressing “propositions”. Every sentence (Satz ) in-
cludes both a thought as its sense (the Sinn, as the Gegebenheitsweise or
way of giving references) and a truth-value as its reference (the True or the
False, among its two possible objects). For according to Frege, the thought
(Gedanke) is the sense of a sentence and corresponds to the other name
of the proposition. In this sense, thought is an objective item of language
and does not constitute a private representation (a “Vorstellung”). Now the
process of internalization leads to an essential problem for analytical philos-
ophy, concerning the boundary between objective and subjective domains.
To put it in words: how far can we turn subjective contents of thought into
objective terms of logic? We return to this point in the end of the paper.
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Meanwhile, Frege’s theory of language entails that any two sentences
with the same truth-value refer to the same thing; these merely differ by
their sense. According to the so-called “rule of substitution” that prevails
for every sign designating identical objects, it results in three variants of
extensionalism − this is Frege’s second main assumption − for three distinct
sorts of terms (individuals, predicates, and sentences):
Leibniz’s Law: ∀x∀y∀P[(x = y) ⊃ (Px ≡ Py)]
Principle of Coextensivity: ∀P∀Q∀x[(P = Q) ⊃ (Px ≡ Qx)]
Principle of Extensionality: ∀p∀q∀δ[(p ≡ q) ⊃ (δp ⊃ δq)] (where
δ is a context variable)
Is this formal theory of language reliable in any case? As is known, there
seems to be non-extensional, i.e. intensional contexts δ in which the an-
swer is negative. Let us consider the case of referential opacity in belief
contexts. Although Tom believes that Cicero wrote De Senectute (sym-
bols: BTomF (a)), and Cicero denoted the same invididual as Tullius (sym-
bols: a = b), Tom may not believe that Tullius wrote De Senectute (i.e.
¬BTomF (b)). A counterexample seems to be found here to substitutivity of





does hold in Frege’s extensional logics but should not in an informal rea-
soning of natural language.
By analogy with quotation or indirect discourse contexts, Frege’s way
out consists in making a distinction between direct (gerade) and indirect
(ungerade) references: in a belief context, terms do not have their usual
reference; sentences do not refer to truth-values any more but, rather, they
express thoughts, so that the thought is that which is expressed in a direct
context and referred to in an indirect context. Now following the principle of
compositionality, no thought can contribute to the truth-value of a sentence,
and the intensional counterexample is thus reduced to a “semiotic illusion”
(i.e. a confusion between two tasks in a sentence) [3:116].
This arises from an imperfection of language, from which even the
symbolic language of mathematical analysis is not altogether free.
The contemporary intensional or non-classical logics have been largely
motivated by this problem of referential opacity; now the previous Fregean
argument seems to challenge their very legitimacy: don’t their logical forms
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result from a sort of category mistake, i.e. a symbolic confusion between the
sense of a sign and its reference? At least three basic features of a “semantic
shift” can be actually found in the current practice of these intensional logics:
a treatment of incomplete thoughts as complete thoughts; a rejection of the
one-sorted semantics; an internalization of sense, notably in epistemic logic
where the truth-conditions of beliefs are specified.
Would such a process have something meaningless in it?
1.2 Objections to the one-sorted semantics
Complete and incomplete thoughts
Non-classical logic is generally seen as a logic in which one of the corner-
stones of Frege’s theory of meaning is discarded, whether for one-sorted
semantics or compositionality. Throughout [3], the author means by incom-
plete thoughts (as parts of thoughts) the various sorts of sentences which
currently characterize such modal logics as temporal, relevant, causal or
counterfactual logics.
The contrast between Fregean and modal logics relies upon the logical
form to be assigned to modalities: in the case of a modal sentence δp, with
an operator δ and a that-clause p, p is incomplete for Frege and complete for
a modal logician. In other words, the modal logician determines the truth-
value of the modal sentence according to the truth-value of its component
p; Frege does not proceed in this way, because p does not have its usual
reference in a modal context and, therefore, does not have any truth-value
as its reference. How to account for such a difference in the logical analysis?
Let us turn again to the case of doxastic modal logic, i.e. the part of
epistemic modal logic devoted to the concept of belief (“doxa”). In the sen-
tence “Tom believes that Cicero wrote De Senectute, the reference of the
that-clause “Cicero wrote De Senectute” is the sense of the whole sentence
and, thus, does not determine the extension of the corresponding belief:
our knowing whether Cicero did write De Senectute or not does not decide
whether Tom does believe it or not. Syntactically speaking, the Fregean
distinction between the usual and unusual reference of a sentence turns the
initial sentence into a name of that-clause: the logical form of these indirect
contexts of discourse is not δF(a) but ∆“F(a)”, where ∆ is no longer an
operator δ applied to a sentence F(a) but, rather, a predicated attached
to an individual name “F(a)”; such a transformation helps to extensionalize
intensional contexts and has been used by other authors such as Carnap
or Quine. In [1], for instance, Carnap handles the notion of necessity as a
predicate for analyticity to which a name of sentence is attached. But the
trouble with this extensional treatment concerns the quantified open sen-
tences: the aforementioned paraphrase cannot be applied anymore, given
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that the transformation of an individual variable x into an individual name
“x” leads to a nonsensical quantified sentence: (∃x)∆(“F(x)”), where the re-
lation between the bound variable x and the variable within quotes “F(x)” is
like the non-semantic relation between the word “cattle” and its componing
phonem “cat”.
The limitation of Frege’s formal theory of language needs some change,
consequently: either compositionality need be abandoned, or the trouble
comes from the one-sorted semantics. The latter is questioned by Kripke’s
theory of rigid designation. Can the problem of referential opacity be settled
within such a non-Fregean semantics?
A two-sorted semantics
To the problem of substitutivity in opaque contexts, Saul Kripke [11] and
such other “New Theoricians of Reference” (thereafter: NTR) as Ruth
Barcan-Marcus, Keith Donnellan, Nathan Salmon, Dagfinn Føllesdal replied
by a two-sorted semantics: proper names have a reference but no sense (a
reminiscence of John Stuart Mill’s theory of proper names), so that not
every term includes both a reference and a sense. In order to emphasize
this univocal relation between a proper name and its reference, Kripke and
Barcan Marcus endorsed the thesis of necessity (N) for identity sentences:
∀x∀y[(x = y) ⊃ N(x = y)]
Let us borrow an example from alethic modal logic, where the central
modalities are those of necessity, possibility, or contingency. If 9 is neces-
sarily greater than 7, and 9 is the number of planets, does it entail that the
number of planets is necessarily greater than 7? Unless a contingent truth
of astronomy turns out to be a necessary truth, we are led to conclude that
the following inference does not hold and falsifies extensionalism:
N(9 > 7)
9 = the number of planets
N (the number of planets > 7)
However, the theory of rigid designation sustains the substitutivity of
identicals when designated by a proper name: it claims that a proper name
has the same reference whatever the context of discourse may be (i.e. in
every possible world) and keeps contributing to the reference of the com-
poning sentence. The failure of the above inference is due to the fact that
one of the substituted terms is not a proper name but, rather, a definite
description (viz. “the number of planets”); the success condition of substi-
tution depends upon the choice of the designating sign, and not only the
designated object.
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Assuming that this two-sorted semantics does work for necessity con-
texts, how to avoid the failure of substitutivity in intensional contexts like
belief? In such a case, the rigidity of proper names and the view of a unique
referring task for proper names don’t seem to be sufficient: the substitu-
tion of proper names needn’t preserve the truth-value (the reference) of the
modified sentence. Note also that Hintikka was a conspicuous opponent of
NTR, claiming that the reference of proper names is not “tagged on their
forehead” but results from the very process of individuation performed by
the epistemic agent [9]. At the same time, one can agree with Smith [15]
that such a critic may seem to be unfair, given that Kripke’s theory merely
concerned the peculiar context of alethic modalities.
After Frege and Kripke, Hintikka’s position appears to be more intuitive
when applied to doxastic contexts: it maintains Frege’s one-sorted semantics
while rejecting its extensional principle of substitutivity. But then how
to account for such a seemingly inconsistent stance, both asserting α and
denying ψ in the initial Fregean implication α ⊃ ψ? The following shows
that the implicational form (i.e. the scheme α ⊃ ψ) in the reasoning pattern
of [3] relies upon a Fregean theory of truth that is not shared by Hintikka.
2 Hintikka’s internalization of Frege’s sense
By contrast to the supporters of NTR, Hintikka does not argue for a two-
sorted semantics and sticks to Frege’s one-sorted version. Yet his view of
logic gives rise to two major alterations, namely: (1) the use of a “possible-
worlds semantics”, as a co-univocal relation (one-many) between language
and the world and according to which Frege’s Sinn comes to be synonymous
with a multiple reference [6]; (2) the claim of an affinity between Frege’s
judgement-stroke, assertion, and belief [5]. The status of Frege’s judgement-
stroke remains an open question, however. For example, while taking its
psychological, performative or illocutionary reading into account, Greimann
[5:215] notes that
According to Wittgenstein, the sign ` is logically quite meaningless,
because “in the work of Frege (and Russell) it simply indicates that
these authors hold the propositions marked with this sign to be true”
(cf. Wittgenstein (1921, sentence 4.442)). On this interpretation, the
judgement-stroke is a psychological operator whose linguistic function
is to express certain propositional attitudes.
Rather, Greimann opposes an alternative reading of the judgement-stroke
as a truth-operator marking the value of the judgeable content; the present
paper follows [10] and maintains the psychological version which associates
the propositional attitude of belief to the judgement-stroke.
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2.1 Frege’s sense as referring
Valuation in a possible-world (à la Hintikka) semantics consists in assigning
a reference (a truth-value) to a sentence among a number of possible worlds,
those worlds standing for sets of sentences compatible with an agent’s be-
liefs. In other words, any agent believes that p if and only if p is logically
compatible with each of these (com)possible worlds; whereas she does not
believe that p whenever, in at least one of these worlds, p is not compatible
with the other sentences (i.e. whenever p denotes the False).
Such a process turns Frege’s theory of truth upside down: the Fregean
connection between reference and sense comes to be translated into a con-
nection between single and multiple reference, and Hintikka’s epistemic logic
affords a formal device to account for the notion of sense in terms of multi-
ple reference or truth-values assignment. To assign a reference in a world (a
model) is to give a sentence its sense. The outcome of this multiple valuation
is a kind of individuation for linguistic items, and the function purported
to accomplish such a task does apply to the Fregean Sinn. For let f be
an individuating function applied to references in models; then the way of
givenness (Gegebenheitsweise) characterizing sense results in the mapping
f(wk, p) 7→ {0,1}, where k is the label distinguishing the different possible
worlds w and {0,1} the bivalent pair of references for sentences (i.e. their
truth-values).
Despite this technical formalization in terms of possible worlds, Hintikka
does still agree with Frege’s views about the two preceding theses. That
is: one-sorted semantics and compositionality are still in order in his formal
approach of beliefs, and the unusual reference of a term (its sense) cannot
determine its usual one. A clear difference occurs in the terms employed
to define the unusual reference, i.e. the sense of a sentence within a dox-
astic context of discourse: Hintikka associates truth-values to that which
constitutes the sense of this sentence, while Frege would have taken this
manœuvre to be absurd since the True and the False cannot be senses from
his nonmodal perspective. Where does the difference lie between Hintikka’s
and Frege’s theories of truth? Not in their theory of truth properly speak-
ing but, rather, in their theories of naming truth, i.e. in the category of
terms which can be said to be true. According to Hintikka, the difference
is to be expressed formally by rejecting the one-world assumption [8]: there
is not only one but several domains of reference to be taken into account
for a semantic assessment of thoughts (i.e. beliefs, in Hintikka’s epistemic
parlance).
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2.2 Belief as holding true
The vernaculary link between belief, assertion, and holding true does justice
to what Hintikka realized with his formal system, namely: a formalization of
sense, depicting the process of (making) sense − giving a reference − within
a logical calculus. Indeed, a close connection can be seen between the notion
of belief as truth-value assignment in possible worlds and Frege’s notion of
assertion as the act of holding true. Do we have the same reading of “truth”
in both cases, and what of truth in a possible world as a variable reference
among several ones (other accessible worlds)? If everything is all right far,
then sense can be determined by truth-values in epistemic logic; however,
these do not stand for one and the same object referred by a sentence, as was
the case with Frege’s semantics (the Fregean truth-value occurs in a unique
available world, i.e. the real world). Now according to what Frege meant
by sense as a public, non-psychological item, the individuating function
or intension advocated by Hintikka to pick out individuals within possible
worlds can be rendered in Fregean terms of sense and references (in worlds).
In this respect, Hintikka agrees with Frege but is at odds with him as to the
manyworld assumption; furthermore, belief results from an individuating
function based on the very notion of Sinn, so that any belief embedded in
a judgement is the “thought” denoted by sentences (isn’t belief a form of
thought, after all?).
On the other hand, Hintikka accounts for referential opacity in terms of
variable modes of reference: substitutivity fails whenever a given term fails
to be given one and the same reference (truth-value) in each possible world
compatible with the speaker’s belief, i.e. when it is not individuated.
Let us note finally that, following van Heijenoort [16], the discrepancy
between the supporters of logic as a universal language (the early Wittgen-
stein, Quine, Russell, Frege) and logic as a calculus (Skolem, Löwenheim,
Peirce, Hintikka, Kripke) helps to mark the contemporary history of logic
as a deep disagreement between universalists and algebrists. However, such
a partition in the history of modern logic has been questioned by Peckhaus
[12]: according to the latter, van Heijenoort would have wrongly claimed
that the champions of logic as a calculus ignored the use of quantifiers while
these already occurred in the algebrist works of Schröder. At the same
time, van Heijenoort’s historiographic dichotomy still makes sense accord-
ing to us from another perspective, viz. the model-theoretical perspective
of many-worlds assumption compatible with the algebrist’s view, whereas
the universalists would have been unable to think about several models be-
cause of their one-world assumption. If such a distinction between one- and
many-worlds assumption is taken into account to explain the impossibility
of formalizing Frege’s sense, the result is the following revised version of his
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theory of meaning:
If belief is a function determined by a set of reference assignments, and
each of these assignments results in a sense, then reference can be taken
to be a basic notion of semantics. Therefore, the process of internalization
has helped to go upstream and account for the rise of belief in functional
terms; can it now go on computing the very givenness of sense, or does such
an operation remain beyond the realm of analysis? This should go beyond
the area of logicians, and a division of labour occurs here between epistemic
logic and epistemology. Can the following problem, i.e. how to acquire a
method of individuation for the objects of discourse, be treated by a logical
calculus?
3 Conclusion: the limits of internalization
The answer to the question “Can a logic of sense make sense?” is a quali-
fied “Yes, but”: a logic of Fregean sense does make sense, provided that the
unique domain of reference of Frege’s logical theory be modified. Contempo-
rary formal semantics clearly corroborated this increasing use of formalism
within theories of language, as witnessed by the actual prominence of the
so-called non-classical or intensional logics. How far can such an increase
be accepted? Can we hope a purely formal theory of the rules of meaning
for ordinary language?
Michael Dummett blamed the philosophy of language for not motivating
the operations at work in formal semantics [2:92]:
A semantic explanation, entirely formulated with the help of the con-
cept of [reference], adequately shows how a truth-value is determined
by its componing words and the way in which these are composed.
Yet the semantic explanation is lacking, for it does not go backwards
enough: it posits a connection between its primitive symbol and an
appropriate denotative, without telling us how such a connection is
established. In logic, this is not mandatory; for a theory of meaning,
it is essential.
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Does epistemic logic bring this drawback that Dummett takes to be essen-
tial? Not as it was devised by the realist-minded logician Hintikka: it merely
provides for a mathematical structure intended to describe the prefabricated
function of sense, but without telling anything about its very constitution.
Yet it would be worthwhile to have a closer look at the teachings of an
antirealist semantics, in order to account for the modes of meaning before
referring and attempt a formalization of the process of assertibility; that is:
the conditions under which a subject is in position to assign a reference to
a term should be taken into account. These details do not occur within a
realist semantics, since the truth-conditions of a sentence transcend the cog-
nitive skills of subjects. Among these skills is the capacity to recognize one
and the same reference through a number of distinct expressions used by the
same individual (i.e. the capacity to perceive the reference transparently).
The debate around internalization is nothing less than a debate about
the place of logic within the philosophy of language. A debate that remains
open to the moving history of the discipline.
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